Cott Corp. – Could go Far, But Somebody Needs to Grab the Wheel

Cott Corp. is the world’s largest supplier of retailer brand soft drinks, and the fourth largest nonalcoholic beverage maker.  Given the recent growth trends in private label, Cott should be doing well.  Unfortunately, in 2006, when faced with slowing growth and shrinking margins, instead of striving to become a better and more efficient producer, the company abandoned its historical business plan and entered the uncharted territory of enhanced waters and energy drinks – with its own brands.  This plan failed miserably: Cott alienated its core retail customers; healthy profits turned to losses; and debt mounted to the point that the company can barely service it.

In May 2006, Cott’s board pushed out its CEO, John Sheppard, who had built EBITDA to roughly $200 million through acquisitions and a focus on efficient manufacturing, and brought in a new CEO, Brent Willis, to execute the new plan.  From then until March 2008 when Willis departed, Cott’s stock dropped from $15 to $2 per share, wiping out nearly $1 billion of equity value.  Today, it trades at around $1.00 per share, less than tangible book value.  As I explain below, this could be an $8.00 stock if the company successfully implements its plan to cut costs and return to its roots.  But it is a long, long way from here to there.  If the company does not get capable leadership soon, it may never get there.

Crescendo Shakes Things Up

Activist investor Crescendo Partners must have seen the upside opportunity when it purchased 8.7% of the company’s stock between March and May of this year.  Crescendo installed four new directors and proposed that the former VP of Canadian Operations and Global Sourcing for Cott, Csaba Reider, become CEO.  Crescendo then pushed the company to slash costs and get back to basics.  On June 19th, the company announced its plan to increase cash flow by $39-43 million by refocusing on its core business, cutting G&A expense, and improving the efficiency of its bottled water operations.  The cost cuts started with the elimination of several senior executives.

Unfortunately, the damage done by Cott’s management may have been worse than even Crescendo realized, and the path to profitability looks pretty long and bumpy.  It may take complete board control, not just the influence of an activist investor, to steer this company back into the clear.

Highly Leveraged – The Natives Must Be Restless

With debt approaching 5x run-rate EBITDA – and 8x run-rate EBITDA less normalized CapEx[1] – the company’s balance sheet may force some sort of recapitalization, or reorganization, before the company is able to execute this plan.  Cott’s $269 million of 8% Senior Subordinated Notes are due in just over three years.  Its new ABL facility ($131 million drawn as of 6/28/08 ) also comes due at that time if the 8% Notes are not refinanced before then. The 8% Notes, which were recently downgraded by both S&P and Moody’s and trade at a significant discount, will not be easy to refinance.

A patient lender, with confidence in management, would give the team the runway to execute a turnaround.  But who would trust this team?  The quality, consistency and transparency of its financial reporting, the reliability of its communications to investors, and the execution of its current turnaround plan have all been disappointing.

Crisis of Confidence

It’s hard to believe in a company when you can’t rely on its financial statements.  Cott’s auditors have sited significant internal control issues affecting the accuracy of its financial statements, and state that “management oversight… could not be relied on to mitigate [these issues].”[2]   Recent events indicate that despite management changes earlier this year, things have not gotten better.

In its second quarter earnings call on July 31st, management said that it expected “adjusted operating profit” for 2008 to be 50% to 70% above 2007’s figure of $36.3 million.  On the call, an analyst challenged this assertion, stating that given that adjusted operating profit for the first six months was approximately zero, “something fairly heroic has to happen in the next six months” to meet those projections.  Management defended its position.  However, less than a month later, on August 26th, the company said it would not hit these targets and revised its 2008 guidance downward dramatically, saying that adjusted operating profit would range from down 5% to up 28% versus 2007. I think this is still optimistic.[3]

On July 31, management said that the reduction in shelf space at Wal-Mart didn’t seem to be having a material negative impact on sales; that they were on track to deliver their cost savings plan; that their “water project,” which was to deliver over half[4] of the roughly $40 million in cash flow increase from the turnaround plan, was going smoothly; and that they and a commodity cost advantage over their competition this year.  By August 26th, they said that the sales decline was more severe than anticipated due to heavy promotional activity by competitors; their savings targets for this year would not be met; the water project was hampered by cost overruns and delays; and commodity costs were squeezing margins.

If management gives us positive news on the October 25th Q3 conference call, will they retract it a few weeks later? [Update – I have been told the call will now be in November]

The Clock is Ticking – With Lenders And Customers

Cott needs to move immediately to assure its customers that it is a capable, long-term partner, and assure its lenders and investors that it has a handle on its business.  This means hiring a CEO who will inspire confidence, and making the other management changes necessary to insure that the company can provide some reliable visibility into its future performance.  It is not clear that Crescendo’s CEO candidate is the right person for this situation.  Rather than somebody with no prior CEO experience, I would like to see a seasoned company leader with real turnaround experience at the helm.

If the company does not act quickly, its customers and lenders will lose confidence completely, taking the company into a downward spiral from which it may not be able to recover.  Its retailer customers need a manufacturer for their store brand beverages, but Cott is not their only choice for private label production.  Dr Pepper Snapple Group (NYSE: DPS) and National Beverage (Nasdaq: FIZZ)[5] also have meaningful private label operations and capacity.  It is not clear if they have enough capacity to service Wal-Mart and all of Cott’s other customers, but if Cott were to lose Wal-Mart, DPS and National Beverage could buy whatever additional capacity they needed from Cott’s lenders for pennies on the dollar.

Low Stock Price Does Not Mean Good Value

At $1.00 per share, Cott’s total equity value is about $72MM and the enterprise value is approximately $500MM, as shown below.  (This value assumes that any discount one could get on the company’s 8% subordinated notes is offset by non-debt liabilities not included in this enterprise value calculation.)

Enterprise Value at $1.00 Share based on 6/30/08 Balance Sheet ($MM):

At this price, the enterprise value is 5.4x my estimate of adjusted EBITDA for the twelve months ended 6/28/08, and 5.7x my estimate of run-rate adjusted EBITDA (see “Financial Summary” below for EBITDA calculations). If one believes in the turnaround, the price is low, because it is only about 4x pro forma adjusted EBITDA after turnaround savings.  If one has completely lost faith in management, the price is high and does not reflect negative sales trends and significant default risk.  The current market price seems to suggest that the turnaround upside and default risk downside roughly offset each other.

Current Stock Price Still has Big Downside Risk

If confidence is not restored soon, default risk may become the dominant issue, in which case the stock price should go below $0.50 per share.  At $0.50 per share, the company would be valued at about 5x adjusted EBITDA.  One could argue that even this multiple is high, and that the company is not worth more than its debt, but I won’t go that far.  The replacement value of its manufacturing assets and the value of its rights to the RC Cola brand internationally should put a floor on the equity value.

G&A Needs Further Cuts

Cott needs $40-$50 million of additional EBITDA right away just to get its leverage down to a comfortable level.  Thus, the maximum $40+MM of savings from the turnaround plan MUST be achieved ASAP.  To make success more certain, Cott should target deeper cuts in the primary controllable cost: G&A.  Instead of sizing G&A to where the company wants to be, it should size it to where it is headed today.  The planned G&A cuts should be $30MM, not $20MM.  This will provide more certainty that the total savings can be achieved soon even if the operational/COGS fixes take longer than planned.

The company needs to adjust not only head-count, but also salaries and board fees.  Last year, the board of directors paid itself a whopping $1.8 million in cash director’s fees.  The interim CEO, David Gibbons, is being paid at a rate of $850,000 per year (including directors fees), plus a grant of 720,000 shares of stock.  Their current CFO made $800,000 in total comp for 2007. How can this be justified?

Crescendo’s CEO candidate has agreed to work for a salary of $625,000 and a bonus of up to 100% of salary.  How about a salary of about $400,000 and a performance-based bonus plus stock options to make up the difference?  Cott needs a leader who will bet his paycheck on his performance.

The Upside – Possibility or Pipe Dream?

With $40-$50MM of additional cash flow – initially driven by G&A cuts and later by the “water project” and improvements in the company’s business model – EBITDA could get to $120-130MM and debt would be reduced to below 3.5x EBITDA (see “Financial Summary” below).  With a return to growth and profitability taking the EBITDA multiple up to 8x, the company’s stock could be worth $8.00.

But without new leadership, this seems like a pipe dream.  The way things are going, it seems more likely that weak revenues and cost overruns lead to a cash crunch, which could lead to a death spiral.

Great Meal for a Vulture

Now is the time for action by an industry acquirer, or a private equity group with the ability to capitalize Cott properly.  Several other firms have circled Cott in recent years, but now this deal may have gotten too small for them.  Likely strategic buyers are National Beverage and Dr Pepper Snapple Group.  DPS is still highly leveraged after its “demerger” with Cadbury and has a number its own issues to deal with, so FIZZ, which has no debt, is probably the better acquirer at the moment.  Cott would also be a great fit with Polar Beverages, which has a strong position in the Northeast.  Ralph Crowley, Polar’s CEO, has a good eye for a bargain.

The Numbers

Below is a summary of historical income statement data, along with my estimate of run rates as of 6/30/08, including adjusted operating profit, and my view on adjusted EBITDA.  I have added a pro forma run rate adjusted EBITDA figure, factoring in management’s expected savings from the turnaround plan. The market seems to be anticipating adjusted EBITDA in the mid-$80MM range, but an EBITDA of $125MM or more seems to be within reach.  If Cott had the right leader, it would be a lot easier to imagine that possibility.  At the moment, it seems easier to imagine a restructuring.


(a) Annualized by applying 6-month growth rate to 2007 full year figure.
(b) Annualized revenue multiplied by the ratio of LTM COGS to LTM revenue.
(c) Equal to LTM figure.


[1] In the Q2 earnings call, management said that capital expenditures should be $30-$35 million next year, excluding the “water project.”  I assume this is “normalized” capex.

[2] In its 10-K filing for 2007, the company states that it had “material weaknesses” in its internal controls, “… affecting the financial statement balances of cost of sales; selling, general and administrative expenses; accounts receivable; amortization; income tax (benefit) expense; accounts payable; intangible assets; deferred income tax assets and shareowners equity recorded in the financial statements as of December 29, 2007.”  It also said that, ”… management oversight within the financial close process … could not be relied on to mitigate the segregation of duties internal control deficiencies.”

[3] In my Financial Summary, I estimate the run-rate adjusted operating profit to be approximately zero as of 6/30 based on year-on-year trends.  Given the lack of progress on operational improvements and continued deterioration in revenue, I think that 2008 adjusted operating profit is more likely to be down 100% than down 5% as predicted by management.

[4] Cott management said that the “water project” would take their water business, equal to 17% of North American revenue, from a zero gross margin to a “fair” gross margin.

[5] If one wants to be long in this sector but does not have the stomach for Cott, National Beverage could be an interesting pick.  It has steady cash flow and no debt, and trades at about 7x EBITDA….

(Disclosure: the author is long COT stock)

Copyright © 2008-2009 by John G. Appel. All rights reserved. You may link to any Content on this website. You may not republish, upload, post, transmit or distribute any Content without prior written permission. If you are interested in reprinting, republishing or distributing Content, please contact John Appel via the e-mail address shown on this website to obtain written consent. Modification of Content or use of Content for any purpose other than your own personal, noncommercial use is a violation of our copyright and other proprietary rights, and can subject you to legal liability. Disclaimer: This website is provided for informational purposes only. Nothing on this website is intended to provide personally tailored advice concerning the nature, potential, value or suitability of any particular security, portfolio or securities, transaction, investment strategy or other matter. You are solely responsible for any investment decisions that you make. Terms of Use: By using the site, you agree to abide by the Terms of Use, which includes further copyright information and disclaimers.

Jamba Juice: Not the Rights Offering I was Looking For….

Jamba Juice announced last week that it has adopted a “poison pill” in the form of a Stock Purchase Rights Plan [1].  However, the rights plan I would like to see would have nothing to do with takeover defenses.  Instead, it would address a more fundamental issue: the company’s need for cash.  The depressed valuation that motivated the poison pill reflects investors’ fear that the company is headed for bankruptcy.   Jamba needs an immediate balance sheet fix, to restore investor confidence and ensure the company’s long-term survival.  This should be funded by equity, not by debt, and not by selling stores for pennies on the dollar to franchisees that are smart enough to recognize a bargain.  A rights offering would be the fairest and most effective way to achieve this.

If the company’s stores were in good shape and the business model worked well, the solution would be easy: cut costs and new store development to generate cash and just ride out the next couple of years.

Unfortunately, Jamba cannot afford to do this.  The stores need investment (I was probably $10 million light in my previous analysis), and the concept needs to be evolved so that it is not just viewed as an expensive treat.  Thus, Jamba needs to spend to survive.  This is a terrible place for a company to be today, but I am afraid this is the reality for Jamba.

The $25 million credit facility does not solve the company’s problems.  The market is smart enough to know that if debt is used to fund spending in excess of cash flow, it can make things worse, not better.

To attract cash investment, the company also needs to address its other problem: lack of a permanent CEO and a well-defined plan for success.  Jamba has described some of management’s priorities, but no plan will be taken seriously unless presented by the CEO who will execute it.

Here is my proposal:

  • Step one: Hire a new CEO with the right credentials and a convincing plan, or have Jamba’s Chairman and Interim CEO, Steven Berrard, step up to guide the company through the next few years.  Steven is a very smart and capable leader, having been CEO of both AutoNation and Blockbuster.  Either way, this needs to happen immediately.
  • Step two: Reverse split, say 1-for-10.  This gets the stock price well above $1 per share, removing the threat of a delisting, and making the stock acceptable to analysts and investors who have policies against penny stocks.
  • Step three: Rights offering giving shareholders the right to participate pro rata in an equity offering big enough to instill confidence among shareholders and enable management to execute its plan – say, $15-20 million.

The company’s current plan, to raise cash by “refranchising” is neither adequate nor fair.  Selling company-owned stores to selected franchisees can be just as dilutive as an equity offering, but does not give shareholders the ability to make themselves whole through a new investment.  In each case, Jamba obtains cash by selling a piece of the company at today’s depressed values.  With refranchising, the company sells a piece of itself to a select group of insiders: franchisees.  With a rights offering, the company offers the piece pro rata to each of its shareholders.  Those shareholders who participate in the offering are not diluted.

Even if one could argue that refranchising some stores made strategic sense, now is not a good time.  It is extremely difficult today for franchisees to obtain debt financing to purchase stores. Those stores that are sold are likely to go at a deep discount.  The franchisees that can afford to buy company-owned stores now are probably parsimonious operators, who, especially in these times, would not buy unless they got a bargain.  Their gain is the shareholders’ loss.

As for the stock split, it is clear that company fundamentals will not push the stock comfortably and consistently above $1.00 per share for a long time.  Jamba’s board seems to admit this in the “Summary of Terms of Rights Agreement,” which states: “$7.00 … is the amount that in the judgment of the Board of Directors represents the long-term value of one share of Common Stock over the [10 year] term of the Rights Agreement.”  If one takes a potential value in 10 years of $7.00 per share and discounts it at a reasonable rate of return for a security with this level of risk, they get a present value that is not out of line with today’s share price.  At the traditional private equity return goal of 35%, the present value is $0.35 per share.  At a rate of 25%, the present value is $0.75.  At a rate of 15%, the present value is $1.73.

A natural question is, “what happens if the company throws a party and nobody shows up?”  Jamba can do several things to ensure that a rights offering is adequately subscribed.  First, it must make the price attractive, which can include attaching warrants for additional shares.  It can also have the offering underwritten.

When a company’s stock is under pressure, a rights offering is often the most effective means of raising equity.  It is also the fairest.  I hope Jamba does something soon.


[1] Some form of “shark repellent” seems warranted, given that the market now values Jamba at less than 1x store-level EBITDA.  However, with a 15% trigger, the Rights Plan seems to be as much about deterring activist investors from shaking things up as about deterring a hostile takeover.

GE Franchise Finance Hits the Brakes

Nation’s Restaurant News reported on Friday, and Dow Jones reported today, that GE Franchise Finance is becoming ‘much more selective’ and has stopping making new rate quotes until things ‘settle down.’  They will continue to honor existing commitments.  This follows rumors that BofA declined to make financing available to the McDonald’s Corp. franchise system to fund capex related to its new espresso initiative.

This trend will make it more difficult franchisors to execute “refranchising” initiatives that have been announced not only by Jamba, but also by chains such as Sonic, Jack-in-the-Box, CKE (Carl’s Jr. & Hardee’s), DineEquity (Applebee’s & IHOP), and Panera.

Jamba Juice: Work in Process, but Rumors of Its Demise Greatly Overstated….

Jamba Juice is a BUY, especially for a private equity group with a longer-term view than the public markets, or for Starbucks or another industry buyer that can help develop the long-term opportunity in this space.  Jamba Juice certainly has its challenges, but for somebody that understands these challenges, a price of about $1.00 per share represents the opportunity to own a top “healthy lifestyle” brand, and the leader in the made-to-order smoothie market, for under 2x store-level cash flow (and a very attractive pro forma EBITDA multiple, as described below).

Why do I care about Jamba? I am a former director of Robeks, a 150-store premium smoothie franchise system, and I have a stake in the success of Robeks, and thus the success of the whole category, so of course I care about the category leader, Jamba Juice (yes, I’m also long JMBA stock).  From my due diligence before leading my former employer’s investment in Robeks, and my experience as a Robeks director, I have learned a lot about the smoothie category, and am in a unique position to evaluate Jamba.  First, let’s recap briefly what Jamba Juice is, then let’s take a look at the numbers.  Next, we’ll look at some of the big picture challenges facing the company.  At the end of this piece, I’ll give my views on what Jamba’s management should do to ensure that the company has an enduring reason for being.

Category Leader in Made-to-Order Smoothies

Jamba is the category-defining leader in made-to-order smoothies – more than 3x the size of its closest competitors: Smoothie King and Freshens. This is thanks in large part to average unit revenues that are far above industry norms.  Jamba had 736 locations as of July 15, 2008 (518 company-owned), and $317 million in revenue for the year ended 1/1/08.   System-wide revenue is about $450 million.

Healthy Lifestyle Brand

While Jamba stores often do not have the seating capacity and café ambiance of a Starbucks, the chain comes the closest to delivering a Starbucks-like experience – but with a “healthy lifestyle” positioning.  The company delivers a consistent, premium, fun and healthy product and in-store experience for its customers.  An increasing focus on healthy living is here to stay, and Jamba can be a leader.

To be successful, Jamba needs to make the smoothie the centerpiece of its healthy lifestyle strategy, and position the smoothie as a healthy alternative to a meal, rather than a healthy alternative to a milkshake.  As a meal substitute, a $6 smoothie is a good value; as a treat, a $6 smoothie is an overpriced indulgence and the first thing to go when consumers are saving their pennies.  Jamba is ahead of the pack in recognizing this, but has a long way to go in executing it (more on this later).

Jamba by the Numbers

Here is my calculation of JMBA’s enterprise value at $1.00 per share (amounts in thousands): *

* Since the bulk of its employee options are way underwater, I assume that 2.6 million shares (5% of the total) eventually will be issued so as not to lose key employees (just a SWAG).  On 9/11/08, Jamba issued 2MM common shares to affiliates of Victory Park Management (“VPM”) in connection with the issuance of $25MM in senior notes to VPM.  Rather than adding this to outstanding shares for valuation purposes, I view this as a $3MM liability, since the shares are subject to a put-call arrangement at $1.50/share.  The $10MM reserve is a big SWAG.

By my math, at $1.00 per share, the company trades at 1.6x store-level EBITDA, 4.0x my estimate of run-rate EBITDA, and 2.9x my estimate of pro-forma run-rate EBITDA reflecting all of management’s planned cost cuts.  Imagine how accretive this would be for Starbucks, which trades at 9x EBITDA! (For comparison, BWLD trades at 13x EBITDA, PEET trades at 12.5x EBITDA, KONA and PFCB at 6.8x EBITDA).

Below is my estimate of Jamba’s normalized EBITDA (1).

(1) Figures are from the company’s latest 10-K and 10-Q.  The pro forma cost cut figure is from the company’s 8/28/08 earnings call, a transcript of which can be found at Seeking Alpha.  On the call, management said that $9MM of a planned $15MM in annualized cost cuts had already been implemented. (2) Includes charges for trademark impairment, store impairment, lease termination, asset disposal, and equity loss on JVs. (3) Figure for FYE 1/08 is “store-level operating income” as reported in the company’s 3/13/08 earnings release.

I can see why the stock has been trashed.  How often do you see an operating loss equal to a company’s revenue?  But I assume that many can look past the intangibles write-offs and focus on EBITDA.  Unfortunately, LTM pro forma normalized EBITDA is still negative!  But at least the red is coming from 2007; 2008’s figure is $8.5MM.  Back-of-the-envelope, I estimate run-rate EBITDA to be $15MM, or just under 2x normalized EBITDA for YTD 7/08.  (This estimate assumes that continuing negative same-store traffic offsets any short-term boost from the company’s deal with Nestle for bottled smoothies – which looks promising).  To get pro-forma post-expense-cut EBITDA, I add another $6MM – the difference between management’s planned $15MM of expense cuts and the $9MM of cuts made to date – to get $21MM of EBITDA.  Today’s enterprise value is 2.9x this figure.  Yes, there is a leap of faith in the $21MM number, but there is no leap of faith in the $37MM of store-level cash flow.

Competition, and Execution Risk

Of course, 3x EBITDA or 1.6x store-level cash flow is only a good deal if one thinks there is a growth story here.  Restarting growth is subject to big competitive and execution risks. The market has definitely become more competitive.  The company and investors are concerned about the wave of new competition from QSRs and coffee chains, including Jack-in-the-Box, Taco Bell, McDonald’s, Dunkin’ Donuts, Starbucks and more.  Seeing this competition invites a long-standing question for the smoothie category: do smoothies really deserve their own store or are they just a product line for another store concept? The answer may be that a basic smoothie is more of a product line, no more deserving of it’s own store than a milkshake.

Smoothie shop chains have all struggled with the fact that while some customers will have a smoothie for breakfast or a light lunch, most people seem to view smoothies as an a between-meal snack, treat or pick-me-up.  In order to get enough traffic to drive sustainable store-level cash flow, and level-out seasonality, many stores have resorted to selling other traditional food items, such as salads, sandwiches, soups, baked goods and coffee.

This is the wrong strategy. As smoothie shops begin to offer the same food items as QSRs and coffee shops, they expose themselves to competition as QSRs and coffee shops offer smoothies.  If a smoothie shop brings in more traditional mealtime food for those day parts, they reinforce the notion that a smoothie is not a meal.  Instead, they need to evolve the smoothie product and experience so that customers recognize that it can be a healthy meal-in-a-cup rather than just a treat.  Any additional food items should really be unique, not things offered at Jack-in-the-Box.

If fresh smoothie chains don’t move in this direction, the QSRs and coffee chains will eat their lunch, or perhaps I should say drink their smoothies….  It’s a lot easier for a QSR or quick-casual chain with an already successful business model to add smoothies than for a smoothie chain to fix its business model by inventing a whole QSR or quick casual business.  Frequent smoothie drinkers, even in fitness-crazed California, generally say that a smoothie is a smoothie is a smoothie.  And, sweet flavors sell well.  The QSRs are leveraging this and will take a chunk of the market for sweet, treat-like smoothies.

This will put some smoothie chains out of business, but Jamba has a chance to thrive as a destination for healthy, on-the-go meals or mini-meals that are NOT traditional QSR fare.  After experimenting with soups and other more traditional meal items over many years, Jamba finally seems to get this.  Recently, they introduced breakfast smoothies, which, while not executed as well as they could be, represent a move in the right direction (smoothie-as-a-meal).  With their new menus, they also introduced a “Functionals” line of pre-boosted smoothies grouped by functional benefit.  These are positive steps, but the next CEO of Jamba will need to take this much further, or see much more of Jamba’s business go to the burger and coffee chains.

Starbucks apparently sees it the same way, and has put a health and nutrition spin on its smoothie offering rather than competing directly with treat-like smoothies from QSRs.  They call their offering a “Vivano” rather than a smoothie, and incorporate whey protein (instead of just offering it as a “boost”) to make it more of a meal replacement.  Unfortunately for them, they have not quite gotten the taste thing figured out yet.  Jamba should be able to beat Starbucks in both health and taste.

The Bottom Line

Jamba has a big execution challenge ahead of it – made worse by the fact that they don’t have a permanent CEO!  Given the huge amount of uncertainty right now, a price of $1.00 is not unreasonable, but once a permanent CEO is hired, I would value the business closer to 6x pro forma run-rate EBITDA, or 3x store-level EBITDA, which is about $2.00 per share.  This would still be a discount to the public comparables because of the fundamental issue that they have never been able to get to a stable, proven, optimized business model that can simply be “stamped out” in new stores.  Instead, they still need to figure out exactly how to be the “healthy lifestyle” chain they say they want to be. Until they get a new CEO, it will be hard to handicap their ability to pull this off.  But Jamba is the best positioned of all the smoothie chains to succeed with this strategy.  They have built a very strong brand, which already stands for the things the company wants to be.  My guess is that the answers are already somewhere in Jamba’s product development pipeline and that the company just needs the leadership to execute them.  Once Jamba can point to a clear vision for how they create a compelling value proposition for the consumer and a sustainable business model, I would value the business at closer to the comps, which would equate to about $3.00 a share.

At any valuation, Jamba really should not be a public company.  It’s too small and has too much left to figure out.  Instead of spending close to $7 million on accounting and legal fees (not all, but much of which is a cost of being public), the company should reinvest this in growth.  A smart acquirer like a Starbucks, or a PE firm with the right in-house talent pool, could get to $3.00 a share of value quickly, so they would be well rewarded for purchasing Jamba at even a 100% premium to today’s price.

PS – My 2 Cents on What Jamba Should Do

1. Make the breakfast smoothies easier to eat.  The current breakfast options are served with a straw that is too narrow, and a spoon.  Who wants to eat a smoothie with a spoon?!  One needs to be able to finish their smoothie while driving and not get in an accident.  Breakfast smoothies are a great opportunity to demonstrate that one can indeed have a smoothie for a meal, but you need to deliver or you’ve done more harm than good.

2. Add more high-protein smoothie options, and use more ingredients that promote satiety, such as natural inulin and fruit fibers, so that people feel full and satisfied after a smoothie to the same extent that they would after a more traditional meal.  These should be positioned on the menu as meals.

3. Offer coffee smoothies, and maybe even coffee.  A process exists for retaining more of the natural antioxidants of coffee after the roasting process.  Jamba could serve a proprietary, organic, high-antioxidant coffee and stay true to its brand image.

4. Add more proprietary savory food items.  The proprietary food needs to taste better!  As long as there are some healthy hooks, such as omega-3 fats, heart-healthy amounts of fiber, or high antioxidant levels, it should do well.  Consumers love to rationalize that something that tastes decadent is actually good for them.  And, at least in moderation, it can actually be true!

5. Get some meal-replacement items into the Nestle line-up.  Right now, the bottled product takes the brand in too much of the sweet, treat direction.

Copyright © 2008 by John G. Appel. All rights reserved. You may link to any Content on this website. You may not republish, upload, post, transmit or distribute any Content without prior written permission. If you are interested in reprinting, republishing or distributing Content, please contact John Appel via the e-mail address shown on this website to obtain written consent. Modification of Content or use of Content for any purpose other than your own personal, noncommercial use is a violation of our copyright and other proprietary rights, and can subject you to legal liability. Disclaimer: This website is provided for informational purposes only. Nothing on this website is intended to provide personally tailored advice concerning the nature, potential, value or suitability of any particular security, portfolio or securities, transaction, investment strategy or other matter. You are solely responsible for any investment decisions that you make. Terms of Use: By using the site, you agree to abide by the Terms of Use, which includes further copyright information and disclaimers.